Warmed Over Cold Warrior

As part of its continuing coverage of the Iraq Information War, the Associated Press reports that a Video Shows Al-Zarqawi Fumbling With Rifle : "Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is shown wearing American tennis shoes and unable to operate his automatic rifle in video released Thursday by the U.S. military as part of a propaganda war aimed at undercutting the image of the terror leader."

Isn't that a great lead to a story about how US Centcom captured the original film from an Al-Quaeda propaganda piece played on the internet? As released by the AQ folks, Zarqawi is shown firing weapons with aplomb while taunting the US forces and trying to build up his image as a great Islamic Warrior. But the facts were very different; in the original un-edited video, the AQ Team seems to be pretty poor at weapons handling - they had trouble getting a SAW to fire in full Auto mode and then managed to get burned by grabbing the hot muzzle of the fired weapon. Not to mention having their star Islamic purist wearing New Balance tennis shoes (guess that's the newest rage among the elite Jihadis).

Yes, the AP and Reuters did tell the story; but the slant from the first paragraph would lead a scanning reader to view it as an incident of US spin. The real story is one of US success in attacking and catching the AQ team faster than they can react. You can get a better (Both more accurate and earlier) version of this story from Bill Roggio who updates his even earlier report on Hunting Zarqawi and Tales of the Tape (Updated): "Maj. Gen. Lynch's observations on Zarqawi's handling of the machine gun matches an observation I made the day the tape was released, 'In the final scene in the desert, Zarqawi shoots an M249 SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon)... Zarqawi does not appear particularly comfortable firing the weapon.' I also noted that it was curious there was no footage of Zarqawi actually leading a tactical operation. It will be interesting to see if such footage exists.

CENTCOM should release this video immediately, as if the video is as unflattering as they purport it to be, it is an ideal opportunity to conduct an Information Operation against Zarqawi. Zarqawi is portrayed as the warrior-leader of the Iraqi jihad, and the compromising, unedited video can work to erode his image. [CENTCOM released the video after this post was published. Kudos to CENTCOM.]"

I met Bill Roggio at the recent Milbloggers Conference. He is a very smart objective reporter and analyst, who is self-embedding himself with the US military in Afganistan this month. Look for his reports and analysis on the Counterterrorism Blog.

Actually, AP and Reuters deserve credit for reporting the Zarqawi Fumble Video and I hope they get a lot of coverage from it. I just wish they would tell the story more like Bill does. Our military is very adaptive and very successful; the press should give them the credit they deserve.

Well, the MilBlog Conference 2006 is history now but it also made history. It was a fascinating educational event for me; the 100-150 attendees were highly enthusiastic and engaged. I hear that a great many more were participating via internet, as one would expect since many military bloggers and blog readers are deployed around the globe.

There are a number of good summaries and opinion posts available now, including this Live-Blogging post by non-military blogger La Shawn Barber. I cite her post because she was there and working all day and represents the new media innovation of a joint civilian and military blogosphere.

Bruce Kesler in Democracy Project notes: "The impact of the Internet, and how it serves our warriors, is the focus of two important posts today. Put these against the rants of OBL and friends, often absurd but always featured by the major media, and see another reason why they’re no match for our guys." He quotes from two posts by Beltway Blog and Strategy Page and follows up with a thoughtful article that asks Is the Press Covering the Iraq War On the Cheap?: "Journalists are reviled by many for alleged negativism and over-focus on bad news in Iraq. Or perhaps the problem is: Their employers are just trying to do it on the cheap. Ironically, the same media that criticizes the U.S. for sending too few troops to stabilize Iraq send too few reporters to cover much more than the dramatic bombings around Baghdad. "

That's a good question and discussed well in the article by Kesler and Joe Galloway. They have nailed the problem - reporters don't leave the security of the Green Zone in Baghdad; they hire Iraqi stringers to give them news. They suggest that improving insurance and training for reporters will make them more willing and able to risk combat reporting. Perhaps, but the existence of so many good milbloggers suggests another option - use them as stringers to report the news from the front. They are articulate and honest; to the extent they have a bias it will be openly pro-American rather than the hidden anti-American bias of many of the Iraqi stringers currently feeding "news" to reporters.

That's a novel way for the military and the media to cooperate in getting sound fair reportage. It would take some setting of reasonable ground rules so that soldiers could do their job first and report (blog) with Opsec in mind. But that's exactly what is happening now and the Milbloggers are getting read and their reports getting spread by other blogs. Like all innovations, this will take some experimentation; and it's already beginning. I mentioned the Milblog Wire before. At the conference, Military.com announced their intention to start a new service to aggregate and publish milblogger posts as news or op-eds, depending on content. Both work on the principle that they can select a good timely feed from many bloggers, making a product that draws readers and advertisers. Bloggers can get paid to the extent their efforts produce reader interest and revenue.

It will be interesting to see how these and other business models work out. But the key thing is that they are happening; the business innovators are joining the blog innovators to create a new media dynamic.

The role of milblogs and the Rumsfeld controversy are discussed in a thoughtful piece at the The Boston Globe . They present a view from the top (OSD) and from the field that I'll quote. It addresses some of the issues in my last two posts but not all. So, first from the Globe:

"There are hundreds of milblogs, and the Pentagon, which has cautiously supported some of them but also has deep concerns about the ability to control them, recently ordered a top level advisory panel to study the issue.

'' 'Googling' and 'blogging' are making their way into military operations at all levels,' Kenneth Krieg, the undersecretary of defense, wrote in a recent memo requesting that the Defense Science Board look into the matter. ''But the full implications of this revolution are as yet unknown, and we have no clear direction and defined doctrine.'"

That's pretty close to what I think and a good reason for the OSD folks to pay close attention to milblogging. It would be concerning if OSD focused more on "controlling the damage" than exploiting the opportunity. Nor should they focus only on milblogging per se rather than on how blogging in general, as well as milblogging, may provide an opportunity to utilize a very large pool of citizen volunteer expertise.

The view from the field cites the big advantage of milbloggers in keeping the public informed and resolved :

"John, the Air Force officer at op-for.com, contends that the Pentagon leadership appreciates the need for the kind of connection between the military and the public that the military blogs provide.
''The lieutenants and the captains of the Vietnam War are the generals of today," he said in an interview. ''They saw us lose not on the battlefield, but in the halls of Congress, the universities, and with the public. They understand the importance of fighting a political war when the military is engaged in a long police action and occupation like Iraq.""

Like OSD, John is also concerned about the possibility of damaging leaks. But that danger must be weighed against the danger of bad or no information leading to a loss of popular resolve and against the benefit of finding and getting critical expertise quickly. That brings me to my next point.

It should be not just about OSD and Milblogs or just about conducting net-centric military actions. It should be also about harnessing civilian volunteers as a part of a national effort in a long war conducted with the use of forces and ideas. That's the key point that John makes about Vietnam. And there are a great many Americans willing to join in a national effort; just remember the enormous volunteer efforts that spring up after catastrophes from Manhatten to Katrina. It would be useful to consider a doctrine that includes that aspect of our power in an ideologic war. Not all the reserves that get called up (virtually drafted or volunteered?) need to wear uniforms or report for duty in the traditional legacy sense.

For a broad civilizational slant on the the current war on terror, consider Lee Harris's review of Oriana Fallaci's The Force of Reason : "Islam, she tells us, presents a threat to the very existence of Western civilization, of conscience, of toleration, of liberalism — .. . (she views Islam as the 'Enemy of Reason' and that it is) ... on a different kind of march, against which the West appears to have no defenses.

It is not just terrorism that Fallaci is talking about — not even the catastrophic terror of 9/11 or the Madrid bombing; what alarms her most is "the cultural war, the demographic war, the religious war waged by stealing a country from its citizens...the war waged through immigration, fertility, presumed pluriculturalism...." What enrages her most, on the other hand, is the refusal of European leaders to recognize what is at stake in this war, ... (as she) illustrates, a situation has developed in Europe where "native" Europeans are being increasingly forced to play by Muslim rules, and to accept Muslim culture."

In this sense, the Danish 'Cartoon War' is a successful battle in an ideologic war to the extent that Western Governments and citizens are forced to self- censor themselves and accord deference to Islam. Over time, this approach produces a cumulative cultural ratcheting towards Islamic dominance with Islamic opponents intimidated into silence by threats of criminal charges or even death. As Harris puts it :
Again, the paradox: What force can reason possess in a world dominated by intellectual terrorists for whom dialogue and debate mean nothing?"

If that ( or anything close to it) is the underlying threat, it seems wise to bring all aspects of our military, political, cultural and economic forces to bear. We have the resources to deal with this. If OSD engages this issue, it should start from a broad perspective.

My last post talked about some new activities on the Milblog front and the potential for bloggers to be an information age militia. It's not a very new concept; one could say it's already a work in progress. But the theme for this year's DSB Summer Study begs the question of whether it would be desirable to form a more collaborative government - blogosphere arrangement and if so how.

A good example is the ongoing translation of the (finally) released Iraqi documents on the web with blogs providing results and analyses ( see Captain's Quarters blog for some good coverage). Like the blog swarm of expertise and coverage that marked RatherGate, this is being done by an instantly formed community with pertinent interest and expertise focusing on a specific problem. The community forms up, works at its own initiative under mutually collaborative guidance, and disbands when the mission is accomplished. Sounds pretty much like the classic modus operandi for a militia.

Of course, these on-line communities or information age militia aren't formally organized and controlled; they form themselves as participants and experts discover a mutual interest and join in a collaborative solution. This is a key advantage that needs to survive any more robust cooperation or joint operations with the government. It's also been largely true that, as in the above example, the government's participation has not been very forthcoming and the leadership has come form the other side ( e.g. Stephen Hayes).

What's not being addressed is how to set up a cooperative endeavor between the blogger and government communities to address a few key national problems ammenable to blogging solution. Off hand, that might involve these kinds of activities:
* Seek help on high priority needs ( mostly Gov)
* Publicize the needs (Both) and free up data access (mostly Gov)
* Coordinate a voluntary effort (mostly Blogs)
* Do the work and keep it open (Blogs)
* Decide on results and and take action (mostly Gov).

There are many "mostly" items because there shouldn't be overly rigid roles. For example, the blog community may see an important need and engage with the government adjusting to help and use the products. Or the action may be simply the making the public aware of what's been done or learned. The objectives of a cooperative arrangement may include uncovering new facts or analyzing critical data; maintaining the American people's resolve by providing credible information; or influencing other nations or peoples by information exchange.

The real question is whether there is mutual advantage to such an arrangement. Is it better to let things evolve as they are or should we form up the Information Militias?

This coming Saturday is the date for the first MilBlog Conference: "The 2006 Milblog Conference will take place in Washington, D.C. on Saturday, April 22, 2006. The conference is designed to bring milbloggers together for one full day of interesting discussion on topics associated with milblogging. We will explore the history of milblogs, as well as what the future may hold for this medium which the military community is using to tell their stories."

It should be an interesting time with good panelists and over 185 participants. One participant is starting a new version of a wire service, the Milblog Wire which "functions like any other wire service, aggregating stories from the field and making them available for your readership. The difference is now it comes direct from folks the American public has a high degree of trust in, not an overseas stringer.The content providers for the Milblog Wire are serving military members, their former comrades in arms, and their friends and families."

And,of course, the original Dawn Patrol aggregating service, the Mudville Gazette ,will also be there as a key participant and panelist. As will Col. Austin Bay, Bill Roggio, and a host of others.

By coincidence, the Defense Science Board (DSB) 2006 Summer Study (pdf) is addressing Information Management for Net-Centric Operations. The study terms of reference seem broad enough to include consideration of the uses and impacts of milblogging both in theater and at home. I wonder if they will send some one to get ideas from this conference?

It would be a great opportunity to learn about and explore the benefits and possibilities for milblogging and supportive blogging to aid extended operations in a long war of ideology mixed with combat. Blogs not only provide information (much of which never gets by media filters), they also foster immediate information exchanges which can discover or concentrate expertise on specific issues in real time. Understanding and using this phenomenon should benefit military operations as well as maintain citizen will and resolve through credible current news.

Of course, the milbloggers are already doing more to keep up morale and resolve on the home front than the media; but it would be nice if the DSB learned about it and how to cooperate with the bloggers. Milbloggers seem to be the modern information age version of minutemen and miltia. There should be a lot of advantage to conducting mutually desirable "joint operations" with the regulars and this new-age militia if we can be innovative about how we collaborate.

In an earlier post, here, I had complimented Sen. Rick Santorum for his outspoken defense and characterization of the current war as being waged against "Islamic Fascists" rather then against "Terror". It's essential to know and name your "Enemy" to fight effectively. I have used the term "Islamist" to distinguish the violent, radical, fascist, jihadist faction in Islam from majority of Muslims and the broader religion of Islam. But no one has a really good, simple and broadly acceptable term for and definition of our enemy.

Jonathan Rauch suggest a good solution to that problem. I think the suggestion makes sense, has historic authenticity, and is timely. So, I'm going to quote extensively from his National Journal article, A War On Jihadism -- Not 'Terror':
"'I think defining who the enemy is is a real problem in this war,' says Mary Habeck, a military historian at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. 'If you can't define who's a real threat and who's just exercising free speech, it's a problem.' As it happens, Habeck is the author of one of three new books that, taken together, suggest the time is right to name the battle. It is a war on jihadism.

Jihadism is not a tactic, like terrorism, or a temperament, like radicalism or extremism. It is not a political pathology like Stalinism, a mental pathology like paranoia, or a social pathology like poverty. Rather, it is a religious ideology, and the religion it is associated with is Islam.

But it is by no means synonymous with Islam, which is much larger and contains many competing elements. Islam can be, and usually is, moderate; Jihadism, with a capital J, is inherently radical. If the Western and secular world's nearer-term war aim is to stymie the jihadists, its long-term aim must be to discredit Jihadism in the Muslim world.

No single definition prevails, but here is a good one: Jihadism engages in or supports the use of force to expand the rule of Islamic law. In other words, it is violent Islamic imperialism. It stands, as one scholar put it 90 years ago, for 'the extension by force of arms of the authority of the Muslim state.'

In her new book, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror , Habeck sets out to map the ideological contours of Jihadism. The story begins, but does not end, with religion. 'Western scholars have generally failed to take religion seriously,' she writes.

'Secularists, whether liberals or socialists, grant true explanatory power to political, social, or economic factors but discount the plain sense of religious statements made by the jihadis themselves.' Pretending that Islam is incidental, she notes, is not just incorrect, it is patronizing.

Jihadists, she writes, are not merely angry about U.S. policies. They believe that America is the biggest obstacle to the global rule of an Islamic superstate. Ultimately, in the Jihadist view, 'Islam must expand to fill the entire world or else falsehood in its many guises will do so.' Violence is by no means mandated, but it is assuredly authorized.

And always has been. The point that Bush, Blair, and others understandably finesse is that the ideology of Jihadism traces its lineage to the very beginning of the religion of Islam. It has 'roots in discussions about Islamic law and theology that began soon after the death of Muhammad and that are supported by important segments of the clergy (ulama) today,' Habeck writes."

Two other new books strikingly document the connection. One is The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims. Edited by Andrew G. Bostom, it provides more than 700 pages of source material on jihadist doctrine and practice (including many fascinating translations from Arabic). A second is Islamic Imperialism: A History, by Efraim Karsh, a political scientist and historian who heads the Mediterranean studies program at King's College (part of the University of London).

A key point from these books is that there have always been two distinct threads running through the religion of Islam - one moderate and adaptable to other religions and cultures and the other rigidly 'Jihadist'. Thus , our problem becomes recognizing this tension within Islam so that we can engage and encourage cordial relations with the moderates while energetically fighting and thwarting the Jihadists. Properly naming the enemy is essential to both these objectives and to devising national strategies to accomplish them.

One could argue that the Bush Administration is doing that in practice while not clearly articulating its position for reasons of diplomatic or religious nicety. Perhaps, but the lack of a clearly defined enemy is very unhelpful in explaining why we should fight a long war. I think it would help immensly if the Administation would adopt this approach and terminology. It would open up a solid array of historical scholarship to define the problem, the enemy, and how he thinks and has acted through history. In a Nuclear Age, I don't think we can afford not to have a broad popular understanding of the essential characteristics of our enemy.

As Rauch's article puts it : "This is a struggle over Islam and who's going to control Islam," Habeck says. "If you can't talk about that, you can't talk about most of the story." Specifying that the war is against Jihadism -- as distinct from terrorism or Islam (or Islamism, which sounds like "Islam") -- would allow the United States to confront the religious element of the problem without seeming to condemn a whole religion. It would clarify for millions of moderate Muslims that the West's war aims are anti-jihadist, not militantly secular. ...... Habeck cites one other reason to call the enemy jihadists: "This is what they call themselves."

Thanks to Instapundit for the reference to Rauch's article. I think it this is a useful and timely suggestion. Read the article and try the books; I have Bostum's book and it is a lengthy, well documented product. Habeck's sounds very interesting at about 1/3rd the page count.

Amir Taheri believes a vision of global dominance by an "Islamic Superpower" is The frightening truth of why Iran wants a bomb: "In Ahmadinejad's analysis, the rising Islamic 'superpower' has decisive advantages over the infidel. Islam has four times as many young men of fighting age as the West, with its ageing populations. Hundreds of millions of Muslim 'ghazis' (holy raiders) are keen to become martyrs while the infidel youths, loving life and fearing death, hate to fight. Islam also has four-fifths of the world's oil reserves, and so controls the lifeblood of the infidel. More importantly, the US, the only infidel power still capable of fighting, is hated by most other nations.
According to this analysis, spelled out in commentaries by Ahmadinejad's strategic guru, Hassan Abassi, known as the 'Dr Kissinger of Islam', President George W Bush is an aberration, an exception to a rule under which all American presidents since Truman, when faced with serious setbacks abroad, have 'run away'. Iran's current strategy, therefore, is to wait Bush out. And that, by 'divine coincidence', corresponds to the time Iran needs to develop its nuclear arsenal, thus matching the only advantage that the infidel enjoys."

In the near term, he expects Ahmadinejad to finesse the UN deadline in April and the G-8 meeting in Russia in June by making announcements of "temporary suspension" of uranium enrichment and of consideration of signing the additional protocols of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). These announcements would have no substance other than to delay or prevent international interference, while Iran builds a nuclear arsenal and a strong alliance of (or underground factions in) Mid-East nations.

In addition to Iran's existing influence in Syria and Lebanon, Tahiri notes that Ahmadinejad is trying to take-over the cash-starved Hamas government in the West Bank and Gaza and has "reactivated Iran's network of Shia organisations in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Yemen, while resuming contact with Sunni fundamentalist groups in Turkey, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco".

I suspect Taheri is right about Ahmadinejad's belief in his religious destiny and the above analysis fits that model. If Iran could achieve effective "control" in the countries cited, it would have a solid "Caliphate" base with a nuclear umbrella under which it could pursue global goals by a combination of low-level warfare and religious conversion. The objective of Islamic global dominance is politico-religious and need not involve major military battles. A gradual decline of resolve and will is sufficient; perhaps with some well-orchestrated acts of deceptive terrorism, along the lines of Robert Ferrigno's concept for "Prayers for the Assassin".

Of course, there are some glitches in the analysis and strategy. It gambles heavily on the concepts that Americans' prefer short wars and are tiring of this war. It fails to correlate those perceptions with the fact that many Americans do not see this war as existential - yet. Should Iran's strategy succeed enough to change the American perception of existential danger, the next war is apt to be very short, very violent and catastrophic for them. And the Iranians will discover that while Russia and China may play geopolitical games with them against America now, they will not join them in an existential war against America.

In a longer term context, the demographics of religion may not be so favorable to Islamist extremists. Those "hundreds of millions" of young Muslims may not be so ready for death when they have a real option of a good economic future and personal freedom. On this Easter Sunday, we should also note that Pope Benedict is preaching a new strong message against religious perversion by extremists and there are about as many Catholics in the world as Muslims. (And a lot of Hindus and Bhudists who are unlikely to convert or submit to Islam.) An open public conversation among religions in a free and prospering climate will favor Western goals far more than Islamist ones.

Taheri thinks Ahmadinejad's strategy is to seeks a slow conflict that wears down the West; I agree that's a danger, but think the combined Western political, economic and religious forces will prove too strong. America just won a 60 year long slow Cold War and the Catholic church and other religions have survived for centuries. The greater danger is that Ahmadinejad is truly fanatic and abandons the slow war strategy for a major nuclear dice roll to create a chaotic environment from which Islam can arise and be led to victory by the 12th Imam.

That's the contingency that is truly frightening and it must be addressed decisively and soon.